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JURISPRUDENCE-STARE DECISIS - VARYIN'G FonCB OF PRECEDENT- Plaintiff
passenger brought an action against defendant driver to recover for injuries arising
from the latter's negligence in operating an automobile while the parties were
engaged in a joint enterprise. Defendant contended that his own negligence
should be imputed to the plaintiff to bar recovery. Defendant offered as authority
a ·previous decision by the same courtl- in which a passenger, a joint enterpriser
with the driver, sued both the driver and the absentee owner of the automobile.
There the court dismissed the action against both defendants on the ground of
imputed negligence. But the reasoning and authority offered by the court were

lFrisorger v.·Shepse, 251 Mich. 121, 230 N.W. 926 (1930).
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appropriate only to the cause of action against the absentee owner. Without any
indication that the issue had been considered, this prior case had decided that
the negligence of a driver is imputable to a passenger, where the two were engaged
in a joint enterprise, so as to bar recovery by the passenger against the driver.
On appeal from a dismissal of the plaintiff's declaration, held, reversed. When
a question necessarily involved in a case was neither considered by the court
nor discussed in the opinion, the case is not binding as a precedent. Bostrom v.
Jennings, 326 Mich. 146, 40 N.W. (2d) 97 (1949).
In the opinion of foreign observers, the doctrine of stare decisis is the most
striking characteristic of Anglo-American law.2 Our judges recognize a more
or less compelling obligation to follow precedents. All precedents, however, are
not of equal weight. 8 Accordingly, a lawyer who wishes to invoke a prior decision
as a rule of law must examine numerous factors inhering in the previous case
in order to assay its forcefulness. If the case was decided in a supreme court, it
will be regarded as binding in the inferior courts of that jurisdiction until overruled
by the supreme court or changed by the legislature.4 In cases of first impression,
the views taken in other jurisdictions are considered merely persuasive.5 Where,
as in the principal case, a court is asked to overrule a prior decision, it will be
less hesitant in doing so if that decision is contrary to the rule universally accepted
elsewhere, 6 or if the decision is not harmonious with analogous doctrines accepted
by the deciding court.7 A prior decision rendered by a unanimous court is less
likely to be overruled than one in which there had been a vigorous and convincing
dissent. 8 Recently decided cases do not speak with the same degree of authority
as older, subsequently confirmed cases, for a recent decision may have led to
unfortunate results calling for speedy correction.9 As illustrated by the principal
case, courts do not feel bound by a holding where the particular point, necessarily
decided, was neither argued by counsel nor considered by tp.e court.10 Understandably, judges frequently attach added weight to the opinions delivered by
certain of their predecessors who were acknowledged authorities in the area of
law in question. One of the primary policy factors underlying stare decisisstability in law-finds its most urgent application where property titles and commercial transactions are involved. 11 On the other hand, certain rules of law
2 RADIN, fuiGLo-AMEmcAN .LEGAL HisTORY 343 (1936).

s SHARTEL, Otm LEGAL SYSTEM AND How IT OPERATES, §7-15 (1947).
4 Cannon
5 State ex

v. Cannon, 259 App. Div. 1055, 20 N.Y.S. (2d) 605 (1940).
rel. Todd v. Yelle, 7 Wash. (2d) 443, 110 P. (2d) 162 (1941).
6 See Bricker v. Green, 313 Mich. 218, 21 N.W. (2d) 105 (1946), where the Michigan
court overruled a tort doctrine which had been repudiated everywhere except in Michigan.
7 The principal case, in recognizing that recovery might be had by a passenger against
a driver in a joint enterprise, made its position consistent with Grusiecki v. Jaglay, 260
Mich. 9, 244 N.W. 211 (1932), where an agent was held liable to his principal for
damages resulting to the principal from the. agent's negligent performance of his duties
as such.
8 Von Moschzisker, "Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort," 37 HARv. L. REv. 409,
415 (1924).
9WAMBAUGH, THE SnmY oP CASEs, 2d ed., 56 (1894).
10 Accord: SALMOND, JumsPRUDENcE, 10th ed., 180 (1947).
llNew York Life Ins. Co. v. Boling, 177 Miss. 172, 169 S. 882 (1936); Liberty Nat.
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(in the field of torts, for example) may be changed without disappointing expectations based on prior decisions. This is true where the rule covers a situation in
which the ordinary person does not consult the law beforehand as a guide to
his actions, the chief operation of the rule being to determine liability after the
happening.12 In constitutional law it is felt that, since the court is dealing with
the organic law "intended to endure for ages to come," interpretations of that
instrument must vary as the dynamics of a changing society require.13 In this
field, too, the court is not able to refer needed changes to the legislature for action,
and the amending process is considered altogether too cumbersome for effective
accommodation. As a result, the solution of constitutional questions cannot be
forecast dependably on the basis of stare decisis.14 In the criminal law the judiciary
is strongly inclined not to depart from settled principles to the jeopardy of the
accused, since overruling a decision may be equivalent to an ex post facto law.115
Conversely, precedents are especially weak when they pertain to matters of evidence and procedure, since courts commonly feel that to overrule such decisions
will not detract from substantial rights.16
Charles Myneder, S.Ed.

Bank & Trust Co. v. Loomis, 275 Ky. 445, 121 S.W. (2d) 947 (1938); Dunn v. Micco, 106
F. (2d) 356 (1939).
12 Supra, note 6.
13 See Douglas, "Stare

Decisis," 49 CoL. L. REv. 735 (1949), for a comprehensive
survey of overruled decisions :in the United States Supreme Court. Justice Douglas feels that
certainty and confidence are more nearly achieved in constitutional law by expressly overruling
outmoded principles than by astutely attempting to qualify and distinguish cases.
14 ''The United States Supreme Court has rejected it [stare decisis] as a rule of decision."
R.mm, .ANcw-.AMEmCAN Ll!cAL HisTonir 357 (1936).
·
15 People v. Tompkins, 186 N.Y. 413 (1906). Some writers would draw a distinction
on the basis of whether the crime was malum prohibitum or malum :in se, reasoning that :in
the latter case the accused was conscious of his wrongdoing. CE. von Moschzisker, "Stare
Decisis :in Courts of Last Appeal," 37 HARv. L. REv. 409 at 419 (1924). The very sensJ."ble
suggestion has been made, and followed :in some jurisdictions, that courts might achieve a
needed Hexibility and at the same time mitigate the harshness of an overruling by giving the
decision only prospective effect, similar to a legislative enactment. See Shartel, "Stare Decisis:
A Practical View,'' 17 J. AM.. Jtm. Soc. 6 (1933); Kocourek and Koven, "Renovation of the
Common Law through Stare Decisis," 29 lr.L. L. REv. 971 (1935).
16 "The considerations of policy that dictate adherence to existing rules where substantive
rights are involved, apply with dim:inished force when it is a question of the law of remedies."
CARDOZO, NATURB OP TH!! JUDICIAL PnocBss 156 (1921). Also see Whitaker & Fowle v.
Lane, 128 Va. 317, 104 S.E. 252 (1920).

